Aristotle’s conception of virtue within Nicomachean Ethics is one of the most important aspects to this ethical treaty as it is explicitly concerned with determining a definition of virtue and the virtuous act as a foundation for moral philosophy and ethical action. To these ends the following paper will analysis the definition and function of virtue as is presented in Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics; with a particular focus on the example of bravery Aristotle uses to define the parameters and characteristics of virtue as well as Aristotle’s discussion on the motivational aspects or moral or ‘virtuous’ action which is integral to understanding Aristotle’s distinct brand or moral philosophy.
One of the first definitions Aristotle uses as a mean to identify virtue is with a scale system. For Aristotle, virtue is defined as the optimum level between inadequacy and excess of a characteristic or particular trait. At the same time it is important to remember that the ideal point on this scale between inadequacy and excess is not necessarily the absolute mean; rather, virtue often lies closer to one of the two extremes. Aristotle uses the example of war and fighting as an example of such a scale, with cowardice and rashness being the two polar extremes with bravery (virtue) being situated at some ideal point along this range:
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Hence the coward, the rash person, and the brave person are all concerned with the same things, but have different states related to them; the others are excessive or defective, but the brave person has the intermediate and right state (Irwin 42).
Thus, in Aristotle’s conception of virtue (which at this point in Nicomachean Ethics is discussed as bravery) is based on finding the optimum and ideal position between the other extremes of the situation at hand. A similar schema could be employed for other virtuous acts such as commerce (where greed and un-rational benevolence could operate as the two extremes); one of the reasons Aristotle uses the example of bravery in terms of fighting and war is to appeal to the readers at the time.
Building from the idea that bravery is a ideal state that is located somewhere between cowardice and rashness, Aristotle then moves on to explore the motivational forces behind virtuous acts (Irwin 44). For Aristotle, virtue needs to be a free choice of determination for the subject. The example he provides is that of the soldier who bravely fights on the front line under the threat of death from his commanding officer (Irwin 43). For Aristotle, bravery (and virtue as a whole) needs to be founded on the idea of a free choice in the subject; virtue as a quality cannot be forced upon someone, it flows from the very core of the individuals spirit.
Related to the concept of free choice and virtue within Nicomachean Ethics is the relationship between virtue and the sensations of pleasure and pain. For Aristotle, pain can clearly not be a component to virtue in terms as it operating as a motivational force. Aristotle makes this clear in discussing pain as one of the motivation of animals: “Now brave people act because of the fine, and their spirit cooperates with them. But beasts act because of the pain […]” (Irwin 43). Similarly, however, pleasure as a motivational force for bravery (such as the pleasure of battle, the blood lust) is not a suitable or determining facet of virtue in Aristotelian thought. Indeed, empirical considerations of pleasure and pain are not features that correspond to the concept of bravery or virtue, instead, for Aristotle: “[genuine bravery …] results from a virtue; for it is caused by shame and by desire for something fine, namely honor, and aversion from reproach, which is shameful” (Irwin 43). To a certain extent, the schema Aristotle develops is based on the separation between pleasure and pain as animalistic sensations, to a pure detached desire for a higher good. At the same time, this desire for a higher good should not be conditioned on the relative pleasure (such as social standing) that will be gained from appearing virtuous. Instead virtue should be sort for virtues sake otherwise the external motivational factors frustrate the determining characteristics of virtue itself.
Another pertinent point in Aristotle’s discussion of virtue in Nicomachean Ethics is the separation between virtue and ‘goods’, which in this case denotes wealth and status through ownership. As Aristotle states:
Those who lack virtue but have these other goods are not justified in thinking themselves worthy of great things, and are not correctly called magnanimous; that is impossible without complete virtue (Irwin 55)
Indeed, for Aristotle virtue has little to do with social status which is based on wealth and the objects of that wealth. The question of virtue and subsequently moral action is absolutely disinterested in the perception of virtue and indeed the striving to be virtuous based on increasing one’s social identity. Indeed, as Aristotle mentions throughout the whole of Nicomachean Ethics, acting virtuously has to be seen as disinterested from both any material gain or when under duress. The man who is virtuous does not seek reward for his acts; instead virtue stems from the application of reason and a desire for a higher ‘good’.
In conclusion, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics represents a milestone in the development of moral philosophy as it attempts to create a practical means in which to deduce moral action. The concept that virtue operates outside the pathological notions of pleasure and pain as well as being a free choice for the subject is integral to Aristotle’s definition of virtue. Similarly, for Aristotle, virtue should not operate as a means to an end, insofar as projecting an image of virtue through wealth or indeed through acting in a virtuous manner for material or social gains. For Aristotle, virtue is an end to itself.
- Irwin, Terence, ed. Nicomachean ethics. Hackett Publishing, 1999.
