The author has touched an important topic in their research paper. Numerous sources on the history of the Third Reich show that the German economy was not even ready for a long war even by September 1939, although absolutely all economic and human resources were concentrated on solving this problem. Such a situation powerfully dictated to Hitler the choice of the only possible (although ultimately disastrous) military strategy. The German military-political leadership decided that the opponents should be thwarted one by one, in succession, in the course of lighting military campaigns, with the involvement of as many forces and means as possible. The concept of a lighting war (a blitzkrieg which had already shown its ultimate inadequacy during the First World War) found its expression both in the overall war strategy, and in the organization, supply, combat and ideological training of the armed forces.
According to Hitler and his entourage, only a blitzkrieg gave Germany the opportunity to simultaneously achieve military objectives, and economically provide for the needs of the Wehrmacht, while at the same time maintaining at the necessary level the industries that provided a very high level of consumption of citizens of the Reich. From this point of view, the success of lighting war in the beginning and its failure in the end presents an important historical fact that demands further investigation.
An important strength of Torres’ research paper is its structure. In the Introduction section, the author provides the background of the war, together with the death toll of the conflict. The numbers regarding participation and human losses indeed brings attention of the audience to the importance of analyzing this conflict. The author also attributes a big part of the research paper to the analysis of the concept of Blitzkrieg and its history. Torres outlines the reasons behind the lighting war success during the early stages of World War II. In addition, the author also discusses the reasons behind the lighting war’s failure after 1940. As seen from the above, all of the parts of the research paper directly address the topic, which makes a very full contribution to the audience’s understanding of the author’s point.
As to the areas of the paper that demand further improvement, it is important to mention that the author could have incorporated more sources in his analysis of key factors in Blitzkrieg’s success. As for now, Torres used only 3 sources in this part of the analysis, which undermines the notion of whether or not the list of factors in complete. In fact, there is some evidence that technology played one of the most important role in Blitzkrieg’s success. The radio communication of German tank divisions is a factor that is often underestimated. Such a division looked like an octopus, groping for the enemy’s position with tentacles, in the role of which mobile reconnaissance units performed. The commander, receiving from them radio messages, had a clear idea of the situation. And in the place of the decisive attack, the German general was present personally, with his own eyes, watching the development of events. He clearly knew the location of each unit: the radio track maintained a constant connection with them. Encryption machines “Enigma” helped to make orders inaccessible even if the enemy intercepted them. In turn, platoons of radio reconnaissance, listened to negotiations on the other side of the front line.
In addition, it might be helpful to elaborate on the part of the paper that analyzes the reason behind the strategy’s failure. For example, when analyzing Blitzkrieg’s failure with the Soviet Union, it is important to take logistics into account. While panzer divisions overcame dozens of kilometers a day, the infantry, which moved on foot and on horseback, could not keep up with them. The situation was further complicated by the fact that with every step to the east the front was constantly expanding. Soon the line of military action of each division reached 50 kilometers – and all this in the heaviest off-road conditions. In addition, soon the first problems with logistics began to appear. At best, only half of the divisions had modern weapons and a sufficient number of vehicles. The rest of the soldiers had to be content with captured weapons and vehicles thrown by enemy soldiers. Soon, even such basic necessities as socks became scarce. It should also be remembered that the Wehrmacht’s forces did not advance along a deserted space – up to three million soldiers were deployed in the border areas on the orders of Stalin. After all, he proceeded from the premise that Germany or any other capitalist country would attack the Soviet Union in the foreseeable future. The research paper will benefit if this factor in added to the analysis.
As to more possible improvements to the draft research paper, it is important to note that the paper does not have a thesis statement. Instead, presenting a strong thesis at the beginning of the paper would have helped the reader to get a better understanding of main arguments in the paper and outline its content.
In conclusion, the author builds his arguments well, conveys them clearly and persuasively. The research paper has a good structure, which contributes to the easy flow of reading. As to the areas of the paper that demand further improvement, the parts that deal with the analysis of Blitzkrieg’s success and failure need elaboration.